Abstract
Introduction
Proofs of security protocols are known to be error-prone and, owing to the distributed-system aspects of multiple interleaved protocol runs, awkward for humans to make. In fact, vulnerabilities have accompanied the design of such protocols such as early authentication protocols like Needham-Schroeder [17, 33] , carefully designed de-facto standards like SSL and PKCS [36, 10] , and current widely deployed products like Microsoft Passport [20] and Kerberos [12] . Hence work towards the automation of such proofs started soon after the first protocols were developed.
From the start, the actual cryptographic operations in such proofs were idealized into so-called Dolev-Yao models, following [18, 19, 31] , e.g., see [27, 35, 1, 30, 34, 8] . This idealization simplifies proof construction by freeing proofs from cryptographic details such as computational restrictions, probabilistic behavior, and error probabilities. It was not at all clear from the outset whether Dolev-Yao models are a sound abstraction from real cryptography with its computational security definitions. Recent work has largely bridged this gap for Dolev-Yao models offering the core cryptographic operations such as encryption and digital signatures, e.g., see [2, 28, 5, 4, 29, 32, 15, 13] .
While Dolev-Yao models traditionally comprised only basic cryptographic operations such as encryption and digital signatures, recent work has started to extend them to more sophisticated primitives with unique security features that go far beyond the traditional goal of cryptography to solely offer secrecy and authenticity of communication.
Zero-knowledge proofs constitute the most prominent and arguably most amazing such primitive. A zeroknowledge proof consists of a message or a sequence of messages that combines two seemingly contradictory properties: First, it constitutes a proof of a statement x (e.g, x = "the message within this ciphertext begins with 0") that cannot be forged, i.e., it is impossible, or at least computationally infeasible, to produce a zero-knowledge proof of a wrong statement. Second, a zero-knowledge proof does not reveal any information besides the bare fact that x constitutes a valid statement. Zero-knowledge proofs were introduced in [25] , they were proven to exist for virtually all statements [24] , and they in particular serve as the central ingredient of modern e-voting and attestation protocols such as the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol [11] .
A Dolev-Yao style (symbolic) abstraction of zeroknowledge proofs has recently been put forward in [3] . The proposed abstraction is suitable for mechanized proofs and was already successfully used to produce the first fully mechanized proof of central properties of the DAA protocol. However, no computational soundness guarantee for this abstraction has been established yet, i.e., it is not clear if secu-rity guarantees established using the symbolic abstraction of zero-knowledge will carry over to protocol implementations relying on cryptographic zero-knowledge proofs, or which of the various standard or nonstandard additional properties of zero-knowledge proofs would be required to achieve this computational soundness result.
In this paper, we first identify which standard and which more sophisticated properties a cryptographic zeroknowledge proof needs to fulfill in order to serve as a computationally sound implementation of symbolic zeroknowledge proofs. This process culminates in the novel definition of a symbolically-sound zero-knowledge proof system; we remark that protocols already exist that satisfy this definition. Our main result will then show that symbolically-sound zero-knowledge proof systems constitute computationally sound implementations of symbolic zero-knowledge proofs. This in particular yields the first computational soundness result against fully active attackers of Dolev-Yao models that go beyond the core cryptographic operations, and it constitutes the first soundness result for symbolic zero-knowledge proofs. Our soundness result applies to trace-properties like authentication and weak secrecy.
Outline of the Paper. In Section 2, we briefly review the modeling of abstract zero-knowledge proofs, and we identify the properties a cryptographic zero-knowledge proof should fulfill to serve as a computationally sound implementation of the abstraction. Section 3 and 4 contain the abstract and concrete execution model. Section 5 contains our computational soundness result for symbolic zeroknowledge.
Notation. By [n]
we denote {1, . . . , n}. We abbreviate x 1 , . . . , x n by x where n is implicit. We will sometimes use sets and non-terminals interchangeably. E.g., given a grammar A = B|(C, A) we might write x ∈ (C, A), or we might say "x has the form (C, A)". We might also write "x has the form (c, A)" for a given c ∈ C.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs
In this section, we first introduce our modeling of abstract (symbolic) zero-knowledge proofs in an intuitive manner to familiarize the reader with our notation and to prepare the ground for the examples discussed below. A formal semantics will be given to these expressions in Section 3. We afterwards review concrete zero-knowledge proofs, i.e., zero-knowledge proofs in the cryptographic setting. Our particular focus is on identifying which standard and more sophisticated properties such a proof needs to fulfill in order to serve as a cryptographically sound implementation of abstract zero-knowledge proofs.
Abstract Zero-Knowledge Proofs
We start with an example that involves a zero-knowledge proof of medium complexity. Assume that an agent B expects a message m and is supposed to answer with an en-
for a random nonce n, a value m ∈ {m 1 , m 2 , m 3 } and for some agents A and S. Here ek(X) denotes the public key of X, and R 1 , R 2 denote the abstract randomness used to build the encryptions. The protocol under consideration now aims at convincing the recipient C of c that c is of the right form, i.e., the inner plaintext should contain m and some value m ∈ {m 1 , m 2 , m 3 }. In addition, the protocol aims at hiding from C the nonce n and the precise selection of the message m . Zero-knowledge proofs constitute salient tools to achieve these seemingly contradictory properties in that they allow B to prove that it knows some terms that satisfy the desired properties without revealing those terms.
In the example we consider, B intends to prove that it knows some abstract randomness ρ 1 , ρ 2 and some values α 1 , α 2 such that with β 1 := m 1 , β 2 := m 2 , β 3 := m 3 , β 4 := S, β 5 := D, β 6 := c, and β 7 := m the following formula F evaluates to true:
Immediately including the values of β i in the formula F would arguably have increased the readability of the formula; our language defined in Section 3, however, will require a strict separation of the actual formula F and the public parameters that are determined at runtime, resulting in this slightly more complicated notation.
Granting B the ability to produce such a proof is modeled by introducing an abstract constructor ZK R F (r; a; b), called a zero-knowledge proof. (Recall that we abbreviate tuples r 1 , . . . , r n by r, similarly for a and b). Its arguments are an abstract randomness R, a formula F , as well as values r i , a i , b i that will serve as substitutes for the variables ρ i , α i , β i in F . In our example, the agent B will send the proof z := ZK R F (R 1 , R 2 ; n, m; m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , S, D, c, m). The semantics of this constructor (formally defined in Section 3) will guarantee two properties: First, a zeroknowledge proof can only be constructed by providing suitable instantiations r, a, b for ρ, α, β so that the formula F yields true. Second, while the formula F and the values b can be retrieved from a zero-knowledge proof, the values a and the randomness r are kept secret. These properties imply that the proof z indeed guarantees that c has the right form without revealing any additional information about n, m. In an abstract zero-knowledge proof, we call r; a the witness and b the public part.
For more elaborate examples on how zero-knowledge proofs can be used in an abstract setting, comprising a larger set of base constructors such as blind signatures, we refer the interested reader to [3] .
Concrete Zero-Knowledge Proofs
We now move to concrete zero-knowledge proofs, i.e., zero-knowledge proofs in the cryptographic setting. A central contribution of this paper is to identify which standard and more sophisticated additional properties of zeroknowledge proofs are required to establish the desired computational soundness result. Hence we now explain in some detail why each such property is needed. In the end, this task will culminate in the novel definition of a symbolicallysound zero-knowledge proof system. We first state the properties in an informal way and give the exact definitions in Definition 1.
Completeness, Soundness, and Zero-knowledge. We start with the basic definition of a non-interactive zeroknowledge proof. We need to focus on non-interactive proofs since the abstract model considers a proof as a single message that can processed further locally, e.g., it can be encrypted. This would not be meaningful if the zeroknowledge proof was allowed to be interactive.
A zero-knowledge proof consists of four algorithms K, P, V, S, called the CRS-generator, the prover, the verifier, and the simulator, respectively. The CRS-generator outputs a random bitstring called the common reference string (CRS) that can be seen as a public key for the encryption scheme. The prover P expects as inputs the CRS, a circuit C, and a witness w such that C(w) = 1 and outputs a corresponding proof z (intuitively denoting that C is a satisfiable circuit). The verifier expects the CRS, a circuit C, and a proof z and checks whether z is indeed a proof for the satisfiability of C. (It is sufficient to consider satisfiability of circuits since every NP-language can be reduced to this problem.)
Three properties are expected from a zero-knowledge proof: It should be possible to prove correct statements (completeness), it should not be possible to prove incorrect statements (soundness), and the verifier should not learn anything about the witness, beyond what can be deduced from the fact that C is satisfiable (zero-knowledge):
• Completeness: For any C and w with C(w) = 1, if z is the proof produced by P , then V accepts z.
• Soundness: For any C and w with C(w) = 0, and for any polynomial-time adversary A that outputs a proof z, the verifier does not accept z.
• Zero-knowledge: When computing the CRS, the algorithm K additionally outputs a simulation trapdoor simtd (that can be seen as a secret key for the CRS) such that the following holds: Fix C and w with C(w) = 1. Let z be the proof produced by prover P . Let z be the proof produced by S on input simtd and C (but not w). Then z and z are computationally indistinguishable. In this section, we omit certain details such as the fact that the conditions are allowed to be broken with negligible probability. Similarly, we implicitly assume that P and V use the circuit C and the witness w. The final Definition 1 below will contain all these details.
A scheme satisfying these three properties is referred to as a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system. Readers that are familiar with interactive zero-knowledge proof may notice that the definition of interactive zero-knowledge proofs does not include a CRS. In the non-interactive case, however, zero-knowledge proofs without a CRS are impossible unless NP ⊆ BPP [22, Thm. 4.4.12] .
Extractability. While the three properties of completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge are sufficient for many applications, they do not suffice to offer a cryptographically sound implementation of abstract zeroknowledge proofs. This can be seen by inspecting the following example: Assume that we are using an encryption scheme that permits to efficiently check that a given ciphertext c constitutes a valid encryption of some message (without having to know this message or the secret key). Then let c := {m} R ek(a) and consider the proof z := ZK R F (R; m; c, a) with F := (β 1 = {α 1 } ρ1 ek(β2) ), i.e., a proof that one knows the message and the randomness contained in c. In the cryptographic setting, this proof would be performed by first constructing a circuit C such that C(R, m) = 1 iff m is encrypted with randomness R and the public key of a yields the ciphertext c. Since one can efficiently check if c is the encryption of some message, one can hence efficiently check as well if C has a satisfying input. Thus, one can prove the satisfiability of C without having to use R, m. Such a proof trivially conforms to the zero-knowledge property, since the proof does not exploit the witness, and it satisfies soundness since it only proves valid statements (if C was not satisfiable, the proof would not succeed). In the abstract model, however, it is obvious that one needs to know m in order to produce z. What went wrong? The soundness condition only guarantees the existence of a witness, but it does not require the prover to actually know this witness. We introduce an additional algorithm E (besides K, P, V, S, called the extraction algorithm) to capture this requirement and define the stronger condition of extractability. A proof system with extractability is called a proof of knowledge.
• Extractability: When computing the CRS, the algorithm K additionally outputs an extraction trapdoor extd such that: Fix C (where C may or may not be satisfiable). For a polynomial-time adversary A that outputs a proof proof , we have that if V accepts proof , then E(C, proof , extd) outputs a witness w with C(w) = 1. With this definition, our example no longer causes any problems: An extractable proof system that allows to prove the satisfiability of C without using w would lead to a contradiction since the machines A and E together could then compute w. (Technically, this is only a contradiction if w is not easy to compute from C in the first place.) We stress that extractability already implies soundness: If C is not satisfiable, then E(C, proof , extd) cannot output a witness w with C(w) = 1, thus by contraposition we have that V does not accept proof .
Extraction zero-knowledge. Even complementing the properties completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge with the extractability property is still not sufficient for the desired computational soundness result. Consider a proof system with the following property: If proof 1 constitutes a proof for the circuit C 1 and proof 2 constitutes a proof for the circuit C 2 , then (proof 1 , proof 2 ) constitutes a proof for the circuit
). This property is not unrealistic, and for circuits that are of this conjunctive form, concatenating proofs for the individual circuits indeed often constitutes the most efficient way to produce a proof for the combined circuit. Furthermore, allowing to prove these sub-circuit individually does not contradict the properties we have discussed so far. In the abstract model, however, given ZK R F (r; a; b) and ZK R F (r ; a ; b ), it is not possible to construct a proof ZK _ F ∧F (_; _; b, b ) without knowing r, r , a, a (where _ matches everything, and where in the formula F the ρ 1 , α 1 , β 1 are renamed to ρ 2 , α 2 , β 2 ). We hence have to exclude the possibility of concatenating proofs to generate new proofs. More precisely, we have to ensure that given a proof for some statement x 1 , it is not possible to construct a proof for another statement x 2 , even if x 2 is logically related to x 1 . This property is called non-malleability and closely resembles the notion of non-malleability of encryption schemes. In the context of zero-knowledge, several properties are known to imply nonmalleability. We will exploit the extraction zero-knowledge property from [26] . Although this is a rather strong property and weaker definitions of non-malleability exist, our proof relies on this particular property; we leave it as an open problem if our computational soundness result can be proven using a weaker formalization of non-malleability.
• Extraction zero-knowledge: Let simtd , extd be the simulation and the extraction trapdoor as output by K, respectively. Consider a polynomial-time adversary A that has access to the simulation trapdoor simtd and to an extraction oracle E(C, ·, extd ), i.e., when invoking the oracle E(C, ·, extd ) with input proof , it returns E(C, proof , extd) where E is the extraction algorithm. The adversary may output C, w with C(w) = 1. Then the adversary gets either (a) a real proof proof produced by P , or (b) a simulated proof proof produced by the simulator S (which has no access to w). We then require that A cannot distinguish the cases (a) and (b) as long as it does not query proof from the extraction oracle.
We stress that extraction zero-knowledge implies the zeroknowledge property since it implies that for any C, w with C(w) = 1 the proofs produced by the prover and the simulator are indistinguishable. Why does extraction zero-knowledge indeed imply nonmalleability? Assume that from a proof proof 1 for the satisfiability of C 1 , some algorithm M can produce a proof proof 2 for the satisfiability of C 2 where the satisfiability of C 2 follows from that of C 1 (in the sense that a witness w 1 for C 1 can be converted into a witness w 2 for C 2 ). Then an adversary A could break the extraction zero-knowledge property roughly as follows: First, it outputs C 1 , w 1 and gets a proof proof 1 (this might be a fake proof). It applies M to proof 1 and gets a proof proof 2 for C 2 . Since proof 2 = proof 1 , the adversary may give proof 2 to the extraction oracle. In case (a), the extraction oracle will output a witness w 2 . In case (b), however, the proof proof 1 has been produced without exploiting the witness w 1 , and so has proof 2 . Since the extraction oracle cannot produce a witness, it will fail to produce a witness for proof 2 in case (b). Thus the adversary can distinguish the two cases, contradicting the extraction zero-knowledge property.
Unpredictability. We are lacking one last property for soundly implementing abstract zero-knowledge proofs. If a proof using the same witness and the same public part is produced by two different agents in the abstract model, it will always lead to two different terms because the two terms will have different randomness. A proof system with the properties described in this section, however, does not necessarily ensure that two proofs produced with the same witness and circuit will always be different (with overwhelming probability). Indeed, it is possible to construct proofs that are deterministic for at least some inputs. We hence additionally require that any two independently produced proofs are different, or equivalently:
• Unpredictability. Let a polynomial-time adversary A output C, w, proof with C(w) = 1. Let proof be produced by P . Then with overwhelming probability, proof = proof .
Unpredictability is an easily achievable property, e.g., by letting the prover include some randomness in the proof.
Symbolically-sound zero-knowledge. Finally, we further require that the verifier V and the extraction algorithm E are deterministic. This is not strictly necessary but it will simplify the proof of soundness, and we are not aware of a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system where this condition is not fulfilled. The full name of a zeroknowledge scheme satisfying all the above properties would be unpredictable non-interactive multi-theorem adaptive extraction zero-knowledge argument of knowledge with deterministic verification and extraction. Since this is somewhat unwieldy, we coin the term symbolically-sound zeroknowledge proof system. The following definition formally defined the properties we informally discussed above.
Definition 1 (Symbolically-sound zero-knowledge proof system). A symbolically-sound zero-knowledge proof system is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms (K, P, V, S, E) with the following properties:
. Then with overwhelming probability in η, C(w) = 0 or V (C, proof , crs) = 1.
• Extractability: Let a nonuniform polynomial-time ad-
Then with overwhelming probability, we have proof = P (C, w, crs).
• Extraction Zero-Knowledge: Let a nonuniform polynomial-time adversary A be given.
Consider the following experiment parametrized by a bit
denote the following probability: P b (η) := Pr guess = 1 and C(w) = 1 and proof has not been queried from E(·, extd) .
• Deterministic verification and extraction. The algorithms V and E are deterministic.
We stress that protocols already exist that satisfy this notion, e.g., the one proposed in [26, Sect. 3] under the assumption that enhanced trapdoor permutations [23, Def. C.1.1] exist. The latter exist, e.g., under the assumption that factoring is hard.
We have formulated symbolically-sound zeroknowledge proof systems against nonuniform adversaries. We believe that our results easily carry over to the uniform case.
The Abstract Model
In the following we define the abstract model in which the execution of a symbolic protocol involving zeroknowledge proofs takes place. The basic ideas follow the framework presented in [14] . However, to incorporate zeroknowledge proofs, we have to make various nontrivial modifications to the abstract model. In the following sections, we try to highlight and explain the design choices made in our modeling.
ZK-proofs and messages. First, we fix several countably infinite sets. By A we denote the set of agent identifiers, by Nonce the set of nonces. We use elements from Garbage to represent ill-formed messages (corresponding to unparseable bitstrings in the concrete model). Finally, elements of Rand denote abstract randomness used in the construction of ciphertexts and zero-knowledge proofs. We assume that Nonce is partitioned into Nonce ag and Nonce adv , representing the nonces of honest agents and the nonces of the adversary. Similarly, Rand is partitioned into Rand ag and Rand adv .
We proceed by defining the syntax of messages that can be sent in a protocol execution. Since such messages can contain zero-knowledge proofs, and these are parametrized over a statement that is to be proven, we first have to define the syntax of these formulas. Let
where i = 1, 2, . . . . We call terms produced by this grammar ZK-terms. On the intuitive level, ek(a) denotes a public encryption key of agent a, ·, · a pair, and {t} R ek(a) an encryption of t with the public key of a using randomness R.
Then a ZK-Formula F is a Boolean formula over terms of the form ZKTerm = ZKTerm satisfying the following conditions: If α i occurs in F , then α 1 , . . . , α i occur all in F . An analogous condition holds for ρ i and β i . 1 We denote the set of ZK-Formulas with Formula. The α-arity of a ZKFormula F is the largest index of an α i occurring in F . The ρ-arity and the β-arity are defined analogously.
The intuitive interpretation of a ZK-formula is that it is a term with free variables ρ, α, and β. The ρ will be substituted with randomness, the α and β with messages. A zero-knowledge proof ZK R F (r; a; b) then represents a proof that when substituting r, a, b for ρ, α, β, the resulting expression F r,a,b ρ,α,β is a true statement. The randomness r and the messages a will be considered secret, while the messages b will be contained in the proof in clear (one can think of the formula as being parametrized in the values b).
Note the following interesting asymmetry: We allow ek(β i ) to appear in a formula, but not ek(α i ). This is due to the fact that a proof with a formula containing ek(α i ) would not be easily realizable computationally: In order to perform the zero-knowledge proof, we need to build a circuit accepting only satisfying values a for the α. To build such a circuit for a formula with ek(α i ), one would have to encode a list of all public keys in this circuit. On the other hand, in the case of ek(β i ), the value b i substituted for β i is known while constructing the circuit, thus we can directly hard-code ek(b i ) into the circuit.
Given the syntax for ZK-formulas, we can define the set M of messages as
with the following additional condition: For each subterm ZK Rand F (r; a; b), we have that |r|, |a|, |b| are the ρ-arity, α-arity, and β-arity of F , respectively. Here ek(a) and dk(a) represent encryption and decryption keys for the agent a, ·, · means pairing, {t} R ek(a) is the encryption of message t under the key ek(a) with randomness R, and ZK R F (r; a; b) denotes a zero-knowledge proof for the formula F produced using the randomness R where the (secret) witness consists of the randomness r and the messages a, and the public part consists of the messages b.
Since both honest agents and the adversary should only send ZK-proofs that actually correspond to true statements, we will need the following definition that characterizes the messages that do not contain wrong proofs. Deduction rules. In order to restrict the actions the adversary may perform during a protocol execution, we have to introduce a deduction relation which is given by the rules in Figure 1 .
Definition 2 (True ZK-Proofs). Let a message of the form
More interesting and involved is the last rule in Figure 1 
For the randomness r, however, the condition is more involved. The adversary may know some randomness r i in two cases. First, if it is its own randomness r i ∈ Rand adv . Second, it may be able to extract that randomness from an encryption produced by some honest party. Namely, the condition that a cryptosystem is IND-CCA secure does not imply that one cannot retrieve the randomness used in an encryption provided one can decrypt that message. For example, in the popular RSA-OAEP cryptosystem [9, 21] , the randomness used for encrypting a message is actually computed during an honest decryption. Thus we have to allow the adversary to use randomness r i from messages it was able to decrypt. As an example why this condition is actually needed for computational soundness, consider the following simple protocol. Agent a sends c := {m} If we would only allow the adversary to use r i ∈ Rand adv in the witness, the protocol would be secure abstractly, even if the adversary knows the secret key sk (b). Yet a concrete adversary could possibly (depending on the encryption scheme) extract the randomness from c and produce such a proof. Patterns. In order to conveniently define the notion of a protocol, we need a way to succinctly describe how messages are parsed and constructed by honest agents. To this aim, we define the concept of a pattern. 4 Let X.a, X.n, X.p, X.c, X.z be countably infinite sets (variables of sort agent, nonce, pair, ciphertext, ZK-proof, respectively). Let X := X.a|X.n|X.e|X.p|X.c|X.z. In the following, when considering mappings from variables X to messages M, we will always assume that a variable is mapped to a message of corresponding type. We then define the set Pat of patterns as
with the following additional conditions: For each subterm ZK Rand F (r; a; b), we have that |r|, |a|, |b| are the ρ-arity, α-arity, and β-arity of F , respectively, and if ek(β i ) occurs in F , then b i has the form ek(A) or ek(X.a). These conditions are needed to ensure that a pattern (containing no _) becomes a valid message when the variables are instantiated.
The symbol _ is supposed to match anything. More exactly, we say a message m ∈ M matches a pattern p ∈ Pat if there is a substitution θ : X → M such that pθ equals m up to occurrences of _ in pθ (where distinct occurrences of _ may correspond to different subterms in m). We call θ the matcher of m and p. Thus intuitively _ in a pattern corresponds to a value we do not care about and that we do not intend to (and cannot) extract, e.g., the randomness used in a ciphertext 5 or the witness of a zero-knowledge proof.
message it already knew. 4 Note that one could be tempted to define a pattern just as a message with variables in it. However, this definition would leave several points open, e.g., variables of what type might occur in which position, etc. Thus we give an explicit grammar and use this opportunity to reduce the set of patterns to such that make sense in protocols (e.g., a protocol may not explicitly send Garbage. 5 On the preceding page we said that it is possible to extract randomness from ciphertexts. However, at that point we were talking about the adversary and had to assume the worst case. When defining protocols, we Note that patterns do not contain explicit nonces, agent identifiers, or garbage. We omit garbage because we do not want the protocol to explicitly construct ill-formed messages. Nonces and agents are not needed since the protocol execution (see below) will provide pre-initialized variables for the nonces used by an agent and for the ids of the communication partners in a given protocol session. We disallow patterns of the form dk(a) since we do not allow protocols to explicitly use their private keys (except for decrypting). This is to ensure that no key cycles occur; it is known that the IND-CCA property does not guarantee security in the presence of key cycles.
Roles and protocols.
We are now ready to define what a protocol is. For space reasons, we only give an informal description and postpone exact definitions to Appendix A. A k-party protocol Π is a mapping that assigns each i ∈ [k] a role Π(i). In our setting, a role is modeled as an ordered edge-labeled finite tree. The nodes of the role tree correspond to states of an agent executing that role, and the edges correspond to transitions caused by incoming messages. We assume only insecure channels between agents, therefore all messages are sent to the adversary and received from the adversary. What messages a role sends, and the state the role enters upon receipt of a given message is specified by the labels on the edges of the role tree. More concretely, an edge is labeled with a pair (l, r) of patterns. Here l represents the pattern for matching incoming messages, and r the pattern for constructing the answers to these messages. More exactly, the state of a role consists of a node in its tree, and a partial mapping σ : X → M representing (fragments of) messages parsed so far. Given an incoming message m, a state σ, and an edge (l, r), the following steps take place:
• First, in the pattern l, the variables that have already been assigned are instantiated. Formally, the pattern lσ is computed.
• Then m is matched against lσ. If this succeeds, let θ be the matcher. Otherwise, the transition corresponding to the edge (l, r) will not be taken.
• Now all variables in the outgoing pattern r are instantiated, either with variables assigned previously in σ, or in the previous step (θ). More formally, the message m := rσθ is computed. If m does not contain true proofs (Definition 2), the transition will not be taken.
Otherwise follow the edge, send message m and let the new state be σ ∪ θ. A node may have several outgoing (ordered) edges, in this case the first one will be chosen that matches and results in a message m containing true proofs. If no such edge is found, the role will ignore the message m (i.e., the state is unmodified). A role may access the agent id of the i-th communication partners in its session via the pre-initialized variable A i ∈ X.a, and accesses its own nonces via the preinitialized variables X j Ai ∈ X.n (accessing the nonces via variables enables us to model that each session has different nonces).
This model of a role is very similar to that presented in [14] with the exception of the additional check whether the outgoing message m contains true proofs. This check is necessary, since we have no syntactic condition that guarantees that a role can only generate true proofs. In particular, if a role produces proofs that depend on incoming messages, and if these messages happen to be modified by the adversary, it may happen that the proofs are instantiated with the wrong values. Thus we have to make a design choice. We can restrict the patterns such that no matter how the variables are instantiated, no incorrect proofs can be produced. We can impose a static condition on the roles that guarantees that for no sequence of incoming messages, an incorrect proof can be produced. Or we can perform a runtime check to avoid incorrect proofs. The first method seems very restrictive, the second might make the definition of a role unnecessarily complicated, thus we have opted for the third variant. Note that not all current tools for protocol verification are able to handle such runtime checks and might need to be extended.
Of course, not all trees with edges labeled by patterns represent valid protocol roles. Instead, we have to impose a variety of sanity conditions, e.g., we have to require that the pattern r (for constructing messages) does not contain free variables, or that the pattern matching an incoming message does not imply decrypting with someone else's secret key. Most conditions are of this kind and just guarantee that the abstract protocol can indeed be implemented as a concrete protocol. Complete details are given in Definition 5 in Appendix A. At this point, we only mention two conditions that are of particular importance.
First, as already discussed on the previous page, a pattern cannot explicitly contain secret keys. Thus a role cannot sent these keys over the network. (Note that the adversary can however get access to secret keys by corrupting parties and can then send them.) This condition is not related to the introduction of zero-knowledge proofs; it is also present, e.g., in [14] .
Since both encryption and zero-knowledge proofs are probabilistic, we have to ensure that each randomness is used only once. In a model without zero-knowledge proofs (as, e.g., [14] ) this can be done by requiring that for any randomness R, there is at most one subterm containing R (but the same subterm may occur several times to allow for sending several copies of a single ciphertext). In the presence of zero-knowledge proofs, however, such a rule would be too restrictive. For example, an agent might want to send a ciphertext c := {t} R ek(a) and then prove that t satisfies some property P (t), i.e., it sends z := ZK R F (R; t; c, a) with F := (β 1 = {α 1 } ρ1 ek(β2) ∧ P (α 1 )). Since both c and z contain R, such an agent would be disallowed. To relax this restriction, we have to allow the use of a given randomness R in the (ρ-part of the) witness of a zero-knowledge proof. However, allowing completely unrestricted use of R in the witness could also lead to problems. For example, consider an agent creating and sending a ciphertext c using a given randomness R, and then trying to produce a zero-knowledge proof z proving a statement about another ciphertext c using the same randomness R. In this case, the adversary learns the ciphertext c and whether the proof z is true (since the further actions of the agent depends on whether it succeeded in constructing the proof or not). It is not clear that the information whether the proof z is true might not already leak up to one bit of information about c. We therefore have to ensure that a given randomness R occurs only in a single subterm t plus additionally in the witness of zero-knowledge proofs as long as it is used in the formula to produce the same term t. To capture this more formally, we introduce the notion of an effective Rsubpattern. Roughly, an effective R-subpattern of a pattern P is either a subterm of P , or a subterm that results from substituting the arguments of a zero-knowledge proof in P into its formula. Formally, we get the following definition: Definition 3 (Effective subpatterns). Let P be a pattern. We say that a pattern S is an effective subpattern of P if
• S is a subterm of P , or
• there is a subterm ZK We can now formulate the condition that randomness may not be reused: For any randomness R, there is at most one effective R-subpattern in the role tree Π(k) (but that subpattern may occur in several places).
Protocol execution. The definition of the execution of an abstract protocol Π closely resembles the one in [14] , so we only quickly mention the main points. A detailed definition is postponed to Appendix A. An abstract trace for a k-party protocol Π is a sequence of global states with some restrictions on the possible transitions (detailed below). A global state is a triple (Sid, f, ϕ) where ϕ is the set of messages the adversary learned so far (the adversary knowledge, initially set to Nonce adv ), the set Sid contains the ids of all sessions currently running, and the function f maps every session id sid in Sid to the local state of that session. A session contains exactly one agent a executing one role. However, since the intended protocol execution always involves k parties, a session additionally specifies what other agents the agent a is (supposedly) communicating with. The local state of a given session is a tuple (i, σ, p, (a 1 , . . . , a k )).
Here i is the number of the role the agent a executes in this session. The tuple (a 1 , . . . , a k ) specifies the indented communication partners for that session, in particular, a = a i is the agent executing this session. The state of the agent a is given by the current node p of the role tree Π(i) and the mapping σ that maps variables to (fragments of) messages received by the agent a in that session. See the discussion of the role tree on page 7.
We allow three kinds of transitions between global states, namely corrupt(a 1 , . . . , a l ), new(i, a 1 , . . . , a k ), and send(sid , m). In a corrupt(a 1 , . . . , a l ) transition, the adversary specifies an list of agents a 1 , . . . , a l whom it wants to corrupt. In consequence, the adversary's knowledge ϕ in the next global state will be extended by {dk(a 1 ), . . . , dk(a l )}, i.e., the adversary learns all secrets of the corrupted parties. Only the first transition is allowed to be of this type, i.e., we consider static corruptions. In a  new(i, a 1 , . . . , a k ) transition, a new session id sid is allocated and added to Sid. The local state of sid is initialized as (i, σ, ε, (a 1 , . . . , a k ) ) where ε is the root of the role tree Π(i) and σ maps the variables A j to a j and the variables X j Ai to fresh nonces. In other words, a new session is initialized in which agent a i runs role Π(i) together with (a 1 , . . . , a k ) . The most important transition is send(sid , m). Here, the agent a executing sid is given the message m and its answer m is added to the adversaries knowledge ϕ. Assume that agent a has the local state (i, σ, p, (a 1 , . . . , a k ) ). Then to compute the answer m , the first outgoing edge from p is searched such that its label (l, r) matches m and produces an answer m that contains true proofs. Details on how this is done have already been given in the discussion of roles on page 7. If no such edge is found, both the local state as well as the knowledge of the adversary are unmodified. Note that the only change with respect to the modeling in [14] is that we have introduced the additional condition for taking an edge that the answer should contain true proofs.
We call sequences of global states satisfying these rules symbolic execution traces or Dolev-Yao traces. The set of Dolev-Yao traces for Π is denoted Exec s (Π).
The Concrete Model
We now proceed to define the concrete execution of a protocol Π. We use the same protocols Π as in the abstract model in the preceding section, but the messages exchanged over the network now are bitstrings, and the patterns (l, r) on the edges of the role tree specify how to parse or construct these bitstrings, respectively.
Since the concrete execution model is quite straightforward and furthermore very similar to the model from [14] , we only sketch it here and concentrate on the design issues particular to the inclusion of zero-knowledge proofs. The details are given in the full version [6] .
Fix a security parameter η ∈ AE. A concrete trace is a sequence of concrete global states of the form (Sid, g, C) where Sid is the set of session ids, g maps sessions ids to concrete local states and C is the list of corrupted agents. A concrete local state is of the form (i, τ, p, (a 1 , . . . , a k ) ). As for the abstract state, i is the role executed by a i , the node p indicates which point of the role tree the agent a i has reached so far, and (a 1 , . . . , a k ) list the communication partners. The mapping τ maps variables to bitstrings (instead of terms) that result from parsing incoming messages. The transitions between the global states are invoked by a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A. The adversary may invoke a corrupt(a 1 , . . . , a l ) transition (only in the first step) and will then learn the secret keys of the agents a 1 , . . . , a l . Further the ids a 1 , . . . , a l are stored in the set C in the global state. The adversary may invoke a new(i, a 1 , . . . , a k ) transition. In this case a new session id sid with concrete local state (i, τ, p, (a 1 , . . . , a k ) ) is allocated where in the mapping τ the variables A j and X j Xi are preinitialized to a j and fresh nonces, respectively. Finally, the adversary may invoke a send(sid , m) transition where m is a bitstring. In this case, for each edge leaving the current node p, the following is tried: Let (l, r) be the label of that edge. Then the bitstring m is parsed according to the pattern l using the variable substitution τ (see below). This results in a new substitution τ where the variables that were free in l are now assigned bitstrings. Then the pattern r is used with the variable assignments τ to construct a new bitstring m (see below). If both parsing and constructing succeed, this edge is taken, τ becomes part of the new local state of the session sid , and the adversary gets m as input. If no edge matches, no action is taken.
It is left to explain how a pattern is used to parse or construct a bitstring. For constructing bitstrings, we first randomly choose a family of random values tape a,sid : Rand ag → {0, 1} η parametrized over the agent a, the session sid . 7 Then we define a function construct(r, τ ) taking a pattern r and a partial mapping τ : X → {0, 1} * . If, e.g., r is an encryption r = {r } R ek(a) , the function construct(r, τ ) recursively invokes m := construct(r , τ) and then encrypts m using the public key of agent a and using randomness tape a,sid (R) for the encryption algorithm. Pairs and zero-knowledge proofs are handled similarly. If r = X, then construct(r, τ ) just returns the stored value τ (r). The details of the function construct are given in the full version [6] . At this point, we would only like to comment on the operation of construct(ZK R F (r; a; b), τ), i.e., on the construction of zero-knowledge proofs, since it contains several relevant points.
To produce a zero-knowledge proof for witness r 1 , . . . , r s ; a 1 , . . . , a n and public part b 1 , . . . , b m (where we assume that r, a, b have already been assigned bitstrings using recursive calls to construct), we first have to construct a circuit C whose satisfiability we will prove in zeroknowledge. For this, let
we denote the circuit that expects arguments a 1 , . . . , a n of lengths l 1 , . . . , l n and arguments r 1 , . . . , r n all of length η, and then performs the operations described by the ZKformula F where ρ i is instantiated with the input r i , α i with input a i , and occurrences of β i are replaced with the hardcoded value b i . The details of this construction are given in the full version [6] . Then the prover of the zeroknowledge scheme is invoked for the circuit C and for witness r, a (as bitstrings) using randomness tape a,sid (R). Call the resulting proof z. Then the bitstring returned by construct(ZK R F (r; a; b), τ) is the tuple (z, F, s, n, l, b) with appropriate tagging to mark it as a zero-knowledge proof. Note that this construction does not completely hide all information on the witness since it leaks the length of the individual components. This is comparable to the situation with encryption schemes which also cannot completely hide the length of the plaintext. 8 If the zero-knowledge proof fails (because r; a is not a witness for C) the function construct aborts (and the next edge in the role tree is tried). Note that the circuit C = C s,n,l F,b can be constructed given only F, s, n, l, b; this is important since for verifying a proof, we need to construct C first.
For parsing bitstrings, we define a function parse(m, l, τ ) taking a bitstring m, a pattern l, and a partial mapping τ : X → {0, 1}
* . Then if, e.g., l is an encryption pattern of the form {l } _ ek(Ai) where i is the role executed by agent a in the current session, the bitstring m is decrypted with the secret key of agent a resulting in the plaintext m , and then function parse(m , l , τ) is invoked. Pairs and zero-knowledge proofs are handled analogously. When l is a free variable (i.e., unassigned in τ ), it is checked whether m is of the right type and then assigned to τ (l) (resulting in an extended mapping τ ). If l is a bound variable (assigned in τ ), it is checked whether m = τ (l). If l is of the form {·} R · or ZK R · (. . . ) (i.e., contains explicit randomness), the message m is not parsed further but compared to construct(l, τ ) (this enables matching against encryptions or ciphertexts an agent produced itself). Finally, if all checks succeeded, the (now possibly extended) mapping τ is returned. The details of the function parse are given in the full version [6] .
We assume explicit type information on each bitstring. We achieve this by requiring that every bitstring carries a type tag distinguishing between agents, nonces, pairs, ciphertexts and zero-knowledge proofs. Furthermore, we require that a bitstring tagged as a zero-knowledge proof is only considered to be of type zero-knowledge proof if it additionally passes the verification. This is necessary since otherwise a bitstring could be assigned to a variable X.z that later will not pass verification, in contrast to the abstract case where only true proofs can be assigned to X.z.
Thus for any adversary A and any security parameter η, we get a distribution on computational traces which we denote by Exec c Π,A (η). A detailed description of the concrete execution is given in the full version [6] .
Computational Soundness
In the preceding two sections, we have described the abstract and the concrete execution model involving zeroknowledge proofs and encryptions. To be able to state our main computational soundness result, we have to formalize the statement that a given concrete trace t c corresponds to a given abstract trace t s . Here we follow [15, 32, 14] and require that there exists a mapping c that maps every message from t s to a bitstring of t c in a consistent fashion. The exact definition is almost identical to the one of [14] , except that we add the requirement that the adversary corrupts the same agents in the abstract and the concrete trace. (τ, j, q, (b 1 , . . . , b n )) := g (sid ) we have that τ = c • σ, and i = j, and p = q, and (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = (b 1 , . . . , b n ).
Definition 4 (Concrete instantiations
We Equipped with this definition, we can formulate our soundness result. Namely, with overwhelming probability, a concrete trace is a concrete instantiation of some abstract Dolev-Yao trace.
Theorem 1 (Computational soundness of zero-knowledge proofs). Let Π be a k-party protocol. Assume that AE is an IND-CCA secure encryption scheme and that ZK is a symbolically-sound zero-knowledge proof system. Let A be a nonuniform polynomial-time adversary. Then the following probability is overwhelming in η:
Proof sketch. (The full proof is given in the full version [6] .) To establish the theorem, it is sufficient to find an injective mappingc that maps bitstrings to terms such that a concrete trace t c (chosen according to Exec c −1 t c , which proves the theorem. The mappingc is defined in the canonical way, namely by parsing every bitstring m to a term. To this aim, we use the decryption keys to parse encryptions, and the extraction trapdoor E of ZK to recover the witnesses of zero-knowledge proofs. Unparseable bitstrings are mapped to distinct terms in Garbage. A small difficulty occurs when trying to extract the randomness used for encryptions or zero-knowledge proofs. In general, an encryption scheme may not allow to extract the randomness used when decrypting, even given knowledge of the secret key. 9 Moreover, some of the randomness might even be information-theoretically lost, so it is impossible to recover the randomness that is actually used. Thus for adversary-generated bitstrings m, we do not aim to extract the randomness but instead consider the full bitstring as its own randomness.
We have to show thatc(t c ) constitutes a Dolev-Yao trace with overwhelming probability. Assume thatc(t c ) is not a Dolev-Yao trace. This can be becausec(t c ) does not fulfill the syntactic conditions of a trace (e.g., the knowledge of the adversary changes in an unexpected way, or the local state of some machine does not correspond to the messages received), or the adversary might send a message that cannot be deduced from the messages that were output by 9 E.g., the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem, cf. footnote 5. the honest agents. In this proof sketch, we will only consider the latter case. We will therefore assume that with non-negligible probability, in step , a message m is sent such that
(1) holds, where C denotes the set of corrupted agents. From this we will derive a contradiction to the cryptographic assumptions used in the theorem by transforming the concrete execution in several steps into an adversary against the IND-CCA assumption.
Simulating the zero-knowledge proofs. As a first step towards a contradiction, we will replace all zero-knowledge proofs by fake proofs produced by the simulator. For this, we first introduce two oracles into our execution: A proof oracle Proof and an extraction oracle Extract. Whenever an honest agent wants to produce a zero-knowledge proof of some statement x with witness w, it invokes Proof (x, w); when the implementation ofc extracts the witness of some zero-knowledge proof z, it invokes Extract(z). Note that for this, it must be guaranteed that each zero-knowledge proof produced by honest agents uses a different randomness R, 10 and that this randomness is only used for the zeroknowledge proof. By the definition of valid roles, we have that for any randomness R, there is at most one effective Rsubpattern in any path of the role tree of any agent. If this effective R-subpattern is a term of the form ZK R F (. . . ), then R does not appear in the witness of any zero-knowledge proof since terms of the form ZK R F (. . . ) may not appear in ZK-formulas. Thus any randomness R that is used for some ZK-proof is used only for that proof (if the proof is performed several times with the same witness, statement and randomness, the Proof oracle will not be invoked again but the old result will be reused). Note the following facts:
• The oracle Extract is never invoked with a proof z that has previously been output by Proof . This holds sincē c by definition only extracts proofs that have not been generated by an honest agent, and only honest agents use Proof .
• The oracle Proof is never invoked with (x, w) such that w is not a witness of x. This holds since honest agents check whether w is a witness before constructing a proof. Hence, since both the execution of the concrete trace, as well as the application of the mappingc run in polynomialtime, we can exploit that ZK has the extraction zeroknowledge property, and hence replace the Proof oracle by a simulation oracle Simulate using the simulation trapdoor 10 Here and in the following, when we reason about a randomness R ∈ Randag in the concrete model, we mean the symbolic value R that is used to select the corresponding bitstring from the random tape using the function tape.
of the CRS such thatc(t c ) (which is the output of an efficient functionc) is computationally indistinguishable in both cases. 11 Whether a given abstract trace is a Dolev-Yao trace can checked in polynomial-time. Thus from the computational indistinguishability of the abstract traces in both cases, it follows that the probability that the abstract trace is a Dolev-Yao trace changes only by a negligible amount when replacing Proof by Simulate. Thus (1) still holds with non-negligible probability. Moreover, in contrast to Proof , the oracle Simulate only expects the statement x as input, but no witness.
Using fake encryptions. The next step towards deriving a contradiction is to replace the encryptions created by honest agents by fake encryptions. Since this step is very similar to the introduction of the oracles Simulate and Extract, we only give a rough idea. All encryptions and decryptions performed by honest agents (with respect to public keys of uncorrupted agents) are replaced by calls to an encryption or decryption oracle. By performing a lookup in the list of all encryptions produced so far, we can ensure that the decryption oracle is only invoked for ciphertexts not produced by the encryption oracle. Then the IND-CCA property guarantees that we can replace the encryption oracle by an oracle FakeEncrypt that encryptions random messages (and thus is independent of its input). Some care has to be taken concerning the randomness: We do not guarantee that the randomness used by the encryption oracle is used exactly once, but instead may also use it in the witnesses of zeroknowledge proofs. However, exploiting that Simulate does not need a witness, one can show that the replacement of the encryption by FakeEncrypt leads to an indistinguishable trace. We refer to the full proof for details.
Identifying the underivable subterm. In order to derive a contradiction from (1), we have to identify the subterm of c(m) whose "fault" it is thatc(m) cannot be derived. We will then use this term to construct an attack against the IND-CCA. For this, we need the following characterization of underivable messages: 
Furthermore, we have that S
T and that T satisfies one of the following conditions: (a) T ∈ Nonce ag , or 11 Here we really need extraction zero-knowledge and not only the extraction oracle Extract is used. Formula (r; a; b) and for some i, r i is not known.
Thus by (1) such a subterm T of M =c(m) exists. We have to show that each of the four cases leads to a contradiction.
T T T is a nonce. In case (a) we have T ∈ Nonce ag . Since S T , for any message m sent to the adversary, the nonce T occurs inc(m) only inside an encryption (with a public key ek(a) with a / ∈ C) or inside the witness of a zero-knowledge proof. Since honest agents construct such encryptions and zero-knowledge proofs using the oracles Simulate and FakeEncrypt , the message m is computed without using the bitstring corresponding to T ; thus it is not possible to extract that bitstring from m. On the other hand, from the message m sent by the adversary, we can retrieve the nonce as follows. In M =c(m), the nonce T is protected only by terms of the form ·, · , {·} Formula (. . . ), we can call the oracles Decrypt and Extract, respectively. Since these oracles are also used by the functionc (at least for terms wherec assigns randomness Rand adv and not Rand ag ), these oracles will answer consistently with the parsing M =c(m) of m. Thus we can guess the nonce T , leading to a contradiction. Cases (b) and (c) of Lemma 1 are taken care of similarly.
T T T is an adversary-generated zero-knowledge proof. In case (d), we have that T = ZK Rand adv Formula (r; a; b) and that r i is not known (in the sense of Lemma 1). In this case the argumentation used for case (a) cannot be used because T does not correspond to a bitstring generated by an honest agent. However, as in the preceding argument, the adversary can extract the bitstring corresponding to T , and using the oracle Extract it can extract the concrete randomness corresponding to r i . By definition of the functionc, this randomness will be the randomness used in an encryption with respect to some ek(a) performed by an honest agent (otherwise the functionc would have assigned a randomness r i ∈ Rand adv ). We distinguish two cases: a / ∈ C and a ∈ C. If a / ∈ C, then the encryption has been generated using the encryption oracle Encrypt . Being able to retrieve the randomness used in that encryption contradicts the IND-CCA property of AE. If a ∈ C, then the randomness has been used to generate the bitstring corresponding to a term c = {t} Randag ri with a ∈ C. Since r i is not known, we have that S c. With an analogous argument as above, we can see that all bitstrings sent by honest agents can be computed without actually computing the bitstring corresponding to c. But in this case, that fact that the adversary is able to guess the randomness used to produce c is a contradiction.
